Winning two championships.

Incumbent champions start the season with a target on their backs. They have nowhere to go but down, and their season is one of if’s: if they can stay healthy, if the can deal with the expectations, if they can keep their focus… if they can do all these things, their shot at repeating as champions is still marginal at best.

The Philadelphia Phillies, beating both the odds and the Dodgers, have clawed their way back to the World Series. They’re joined by the Los Angeles Lakers in attempted title defense in their respective sports.

And they’re doing it the right way—by not being afraid to make changes.

First, some back story.

The Phillies didn’t start the 2008 season favored to win a World Series; or even, for that matter, their division. Only two of ESPN’s panel of 19 baseball experts picked them as division winners. Baseball Prospectus placed them third in the NL East, behind the New York Mets and Atlanta Braves.

But we know how the story ends. The Phillies not only won their division, but made quick work of the playoffs, beating the Milwaukee Brewers 3-1, the Los Angeles Dodgers 4-1, and finally the Tampa Bay Rays 4-1 to bring home Philadelphia’s second World Series win in history.

The Lakers’ story, on the other hand, couldn’t be more different.

Kobe Bryant and company started the season squinting in the bright lights of expectation. They’d just lost an NBA Finals to Kevin Garnett’s Boston Celtics. All eyes were on Kobe to win a title without Shaq.

And they had the personnel to do it. With Pau Gasol, Lamar Odom, Derek Fisher, and Trevor Ariza providing Kobe’s Greek chorus, the Lakers went 65-17 on the season, finishing just one game behind LeBron James and the Cleveland Cavaliers.

They hit some bumps in the playoffs, requiring seven games to beat the Houston Rockets and six to finish off the revitalized Denver Nuggets, but everyone watching knew the end from the beginning. The Lakers feasted on Dwight Howard and the Orlando Magic, winning a title for Kobe and giving coach Phil Jackson a full two hands’ worth of championship rings.

Now, fast forward a year.

The expectations for both teams have been, again, opposite. The Phillies were only picked by three of 21 ESPN experts to make it back to the World Series; none of them picked Philly to win it. The Lakers were a unanimous ESPN expert choice to win the Western Conference, and nobody doubts their chances of beating whichever team survives the East playoffs.

The temptation exists to try to keep the title-winning team exactly how it was. They won a title once—they should be able to do it again. But every other team in the league, having fallen short of their championship goals, has made every effort to get better. Even a world champion isn’t foolish to make some changes—even risking the chemistry with which they won it all—to stave off the next season’s challengers.

The Phillies and the Lakers have both done this. Well.

Philadelphia beefed up their offense in the offseason by bringing in Raul Ibañez to play left field. He hit .272 and pounded in 34 homers en route to an All-Star game appearance, providing a solid hitting upgrade for the Phillies.

Not stopping there, the Phillies made one more move—a move that arguably won them their second-straight National League pennant. They picked up starting pitcher Cliff Lee in a trade with the Cleveland Indians. The left-handed ace’s ERA in this postseason is 0.74, and the Phillies have won all three games he’s started.

Cliff Lee will be a crucial part of the Phillies’ World Series. Just as he’s been crucial in getting them there.

The Lakers’ offseason move has taken more criticism, but the thinking is the same. The purple and gold, even without any changes, would have started the season with indisputably the most talented roster in the NBA.

But the Lakers knew what was in the rear-view mirror. The San Antonio Spurs would later add Richard Jefferson to their already-stacked roster. The Cleveland Cavaliers would trade for Shaquille O’Neal to pair with LeBron, the Orlando Magic would add Vince Carter to a Finals team and the Boston Celtics would add tenacious depth in the middle by acquiring Rasheed Wallace.

So the Lakers made a move of their own. They let highly-regarded small forward Trevor Ariza slip away to free agency in favor of signing Ron Artest—a former All-Star, a four-time All-Defensive Team pick, and a capable offensive threat—onto a team that was already loaded top-to-bottom.

The acquisition has taken its share of criticism. There’s a chance that the oft-troubled, oft-spotlighted Artest, most famous for his role in the The Brawl while with the Indiana Pacers, will disrupt the team’s chemistry or provide distraction from the titular goal.

But if not? The Lakers stack the deck for a repeat.

Neither team has finished the repeat yet, however, and even the Phillies still have a long way to go to get there. The last MLB team to repeat was the Yankees, who won three championships from 1998-2000. Repeating in baseball is clearly the exception; the 1992-93 Toronto Blue Jays are the only other team to win back-to-back World Series in the past 30 years.

It’s been more common in the NBA—sort of. There have been six repeat champions in that same 30-year period; three of them were Phil Jackson-coached teams.

But the moves that the Phillies and Lakers made have set the table for their repeat attempts. If the upgrade experiment works for the Lakers, they’ll be a heavy favorite come June.

And in a few weeks, we’ll see if it worked for the Phillies.

Now that we’re all certifiable NBA capologists (an actual position with many NBA franchises) let’s get into how this affects some of the teams we all know and love.

Most teams fall in the realm of carefully balancing their bottom line with the talent they put on the court. After all, no team has unlimited resources. With this economy the way it is, teams are shaving money any way they can. Well, some are. Some are collecting assets to put to good use. Some are only limited by their own imagination. And some are just plain dumb.

Deep Pockets:

Los Angeles Lakers — Hmmm… let’s see. Huge market? Check. Massive fan support? Check. One of the game’s two best players? Check. A long history of winning and little else? Check.

Translation: the Lakers are just fine. They’ve got the fan base, they’ve got the winning pedigree, and they’ve got an intelligent front office.

They snagged Ron Artest, which is questionable from a basketball standpoint, but a decent bargain. They played hardball with Lamar Odom, but someone caved, and he’s back. As far as I can tell the only stupid thing they’ve done salary wise in the past few years was ponying up big bucks for Andrew Bynum without making him work for it, an offense which almost every team has been guilty of.

Boston Celtics — It’s amazing what a summer of free spending will get you. The Celtics cashed in some developing talent for talented but pricey veterans in 2007 to win a championship, and I don’t think you’ll find any regrets in Beantown.

The Big Three, Ray Allen, Paul Pierce and Kevin Garnett are on the books for $18.7 million, $19.8 and $16.4 respectively this season. An expensive and aging core, but like I said, they got their ring out of it, the rest is just gravy.

The salary situation the C’s are facing right now is very interesting, since it has a very specific method to it. Ray Allen’s $18.7 million contract expires after the 2009-10 season. Pierce’s $19.8 expires after the 2010-11 season, with an early termination option after this season. Garnett’s (which will be $21 mil by 2011-12) expires after the 2011-12 season.

So what the Celtics have done is give themselves a $20 million expiring contract for the next three trade deadlines. Pretty ingenious. I don’t think Pierce will go anywhere, but Allen might be a tasty nugget for someone trying to clear space in February 2010 to gear up for the Summer of 2010.

Garnett’s situation is more problematic, since he’s the least healthy one with the most time left on his deal. But the Celtics have gotten pretty far with their deft contract maneuvering, and they are poised to turn some old guys on big contracts into some young stars.

Dallas Mavericks — With Mark Cuban at the helm, no salary is too steep for the Mavericks. With the economy hitting every team hard, the Mavericks are in a unique position to be buyers in a seller’s market.

Plus, they’ve got some financial whizzes drawing up their contracts. Jerry Stackhouse had a buyout clause in his contract, meaning a team could ship out $4 million in salary, while taking on Stackhouse, but then they could buy him out for $1.5 million. That’s how they turned two bench players (Stackhouse, Antoine Wright) into Shawn Marion.

They’ve got another version of that this year with Greg Buckner, who can be bought out. So the Mavs could take the savings for themselves (not bloody likely), or they can put another package together and offer someone else the savings.

What really makes the Mavs unique is Erick Dampier’s contract. Probably their biggest mistake of the decade financially (not paying Nash $63 million, but paying Dampier $73 million) could prove to be a major coup this summer, and one the league doesn’t see coming.

See, Dampier’s contract, while for seven years, only goes to that seventh year if Damp plays more than 26 minutes per game, which he’s only done twice, and when he was much younger. So it’s an expriring contract essentially, because if he doesn’t make that mark (and you can guarantee Coach Risk Carlisle will be keeping track), he can simply be cut.

So come the trade deadline or before the start of free agency, the Mavs can make an offer to a team that’s about to lose it’s superstar, say the Cavaliers, Raptors or Heat. Rather than having LeBron James, Dwyane Wade or Chris Bosh bolt for nothing, the teams can simply send them to Dallas in a sign-and-trade.

Since the free agent’s team is signing them to the contract before trading them, they can sign the player to a six-year deal, since they’re re-signing they’re own player.

So say Chris Bosh has always wanted to come back to Dallas, but to go to the Mavs as a free agent, he could only get a five-year max deal, and maybe there’s another team that can do the same.

Throw Damp in the mix, and the Mavericks and the Raptors are the only teams that can give him six years, not to mention the Raptors get $12 million in cap space as a consolation prize.

Penny Pinchers:

Phoenix Suns — If you’re a Suns fan, I warn you. This might make you a little queasy.

You see, Suns owner Robert Sarver was notorious for years for staying well below the luxury tax. He ran his team like a business, and while he was able to sign Nash and draft people like Stoudemire and Marion, he also always had his eye on the bottom line.

Circa, 2004-2006, the Suns were a blast to watch. They were scoring 120 a game, and though they weren’t putting on any defensive clinics, they were the most entertaining team in the league to watch.

If you’re Robert Sarver, you’ve already got the product on the court, so why not save some dough? How do you save some dough? Well, you don’t pay those pesky first-round drat picks, that’s for sure.

So Sarver did one of the worst things an owner can do: he sold his first round draft picks. In the 2004 draft, the Suns had the seventh pick. They sold it to Chicago for a second-rounder (who wouldn’t have a guaranteed contract) a future first-rounder and $3 million.

That pick was Luol Deng. It could have also been Al Jefferson (a center who can run, unlike Shaq), Andre Iguodala, Josh Smith or Jameer Nelson. Ouch.

Fast forward to 2006. Phoenix has the 21^st pick, Rajon Rondo. They sold the pick to Boston for cash and a 2007 first round pick. The 2009 Suns have a problem with who is going to succeed Nash, but they sold Rondo for a few million, and now Rondo has a ring in Boston. Not to mention Rondo is one of the best defensive point guards in the game today, something that Phoenix needs at that position more than ever. Double ouch.

What did Phoenix do with that 2007 first rounder? They picked Rudy Fernandez, and sold him to the Trailblazers.

Then there’s Kurt Thomas, a veteran with a great low post defensive game, something that the Suns lack with Stoudemire down there. But sure enough, Thomas would have put them over the luxury tax, so he was traded to the then-Seattle Sonics for an $8 million trade exception and a second-round future draft pick.

But as we all know, Sarver finally decided to go into the luxury tax in February 2008. By doing so ironically enough, it ushered the end of the “Fun and Gun” Suns, by bringing Shaquille O’Neal into the mix.

And since they traded Shawn Marion for Shaq, they’ve had a gaping hole at small forward. If only there was some way that they could have had a small forward. Hmm… maybe Luol Deng? Or Josh Smith? How about Rudy Fernandez? All can run, shoot the three and are decent defenders.

Instead, Robert Sarver has an extra $10 million or so in his pocket. But then again, why let basketball get in the way of money?

New Orleans Hornets — Here’s a little tip for all you potential owners out there. If the best point guard in the game today, a 24-year-old guy that hasn’t even entered his prime yet, thinks that he could be traded purely from financial motivations, then you’re doing something wrong.

Not to turn this into a Jeff Foxworthy routine, but if you take a team with two straight playoff appearances and are run out of town a few years later, you might be a bad owner.

At the start of the new decade, Kenny Anderson, Dell Curry, Vlade Divac, Matt Geiger and Alonzo Mourning were all traded or allowed to leave because Shinn wouldn’t pay them market value.

These moves drew such fan ire that the city of Charlotte wasn’t able to support the Hornets, so the team moved to New Orleans.

Now, despite the emergence of an exciting young team, the Hornets and Shinn seemed doomed to repeat their mistakes.

They lucked into Chris Paul when Atlanta and Utah passed on him, and David West emerged as a good playmaker down low. They were one win away from the Western Conference Finals two years ago, but then this summer, Chris Paul commented that he wouldn’t be surprised if they traded him.

And who can blame him? After all, in February of this year, in the midst of a heated Western Conference race, the Hornets were prepared to dump Tyson Chandler, his alley-oop catching mitts and his big salary to the Thunder for Joe Smith (a power forward, when they have David West) and some change.

The move was so clearly financially motivated that coach Byron Scott and David West were both openly questioning it in the media.

But things could be looking up for the Hornets. After all, the Chandler trade was nixed, then Chandler was turned into Emeka Okafor and his large contracts and his nightly 12 and 12′s. So maybe there’s hope yet.

The Inexplicable:

New York Knicks — We all know the story. The Knicks, looking to return to basketball’s elite after more than a decade at the bottom, spend the last few seasons wallowing in filth, just for a shot to sign LeBron James and maybe another marquee free agent.

A few years ago, the Knicks were a study in contrasts. Their three most productive players, David Lee, Nate Robinson and Renaldo Balkman were making a combined $5.1 million dollars. The rest of the team (littered with such notable cancers as Jamal Crawford, Eddy Curry, Jerome James, Stephon Marbury, Malik Rose and Zach Randolph) made $83 million dollars. Money well spent?

The Knicks have spent the most of the last few seasons trying to clear enough cap space for two max contracts, LeBron James and someone else. They dumped both Jamal Crawford and Zach Randolph for Al Harrington, Tim Thomas (traded and bought out), Cuttino Mobley (retired for medical reasons).

While Randolph is certainly a jerk and Crawford overpaid, they were the team’s two leading scorers, and considering only Harrington stayed with the team, it basically amounted to a forfeit for that season.

Sounds good on paper right? After all, would you willingly go through a few seasons of terrible basketball for a guaranteed golden age?

I would, but there are so few sure things in life. Like, say, when a shrinking salary cap affects the amount of said max contracts. And say, when you don’t have a first round pick in 2010, because you traded it to Utah in 2004.

Will LeBron and company really want to come to a team that’s filled out with a bunch of bargain basement players and no first round pick next year?

More importantly, will Madison Square Garden still be standing after LeBron announces on July 5, 2010 that he’s playing for the Cavaliers, Clippers or Heat next season?

Major League Baseball has no salary cap. That’s pretty simple. Teams like the Red Sox, Mets and Yankees can (and do) spend as much as they want, limited only by their profit-and-loss statements and/or their owner’s discretion.

The National Football League is the exact opposite. It has a hard salary cap, which means that going over the cap will result in penalties such as lost draft picks. As a result, teams usually don’t get close to passing the cap, because they don’t want to lose their picks. The cap is currently $128 million for 2009, which is about a $12 million raise from the previous season.

The NBA is somewhere in the middle. It has a soft cap, which basically amounts to no cap, since so many exceptions to passing the cap exist, such as a team re-signing its own player. I’ll get more into those exceptions later in the piece.

In fact, the NBA cap is so irrelevant that it’s a historical rarity for a team to be under it.

Put a Cap On It

For the 2009-10 season, the salary cap is set at $57.7 million. As I said earlier, this isn’t particularly relevant as a figure by itself, what’s relevant is that it’s a drop of about a million dollars.

This is particularly relevant when it comes to the vaunted Summer of 2010, where there are many high-quality free agents that could be available, and several (such as Chris Bosh, LeBron James and Dwyane Wade) are expecting to sign max contracts.

What is a ‘max contract?’ Like everything else involving NBA salaries, it’s complicated.

For players with fewer than six years of experience, a max contract can be 25 percent of the cap. So, for 2009-10, it will be $14,472,500. It’s pretty rare that a player with so little experience would get a max contract, but Brandon Roy (who just locked up a max extension locked with the Blazers) and probably Kevin Durant are exceptions.

For players with seven to nine years of experience, it is 30% of the cap, or $17,310,000. This is where the Summer of 2010 comes into play. LeBron, D-Wade and Bosh, all of whom were drafted in 2003, will be finishing their seventh seasons in the league (I know, where does the time go?) in June 2010. (Their other draftmate, Carmelo Anthony, elected to sign a five-year extension in the summer of 2006, while the other three signed three-year deals.)

So, with a reduction in cap, you’re looking at a reduction in the max contract. Basically, it means the vaunted Free Agent Summer of 2010 could literally be the worst season possible for players to seek max deals. Sort of ironic, don’t you think?

But There’s a Tax on That Luxury

Now let’s get into the luxury tax, which is something that certain teams live and die by. The luxury tax is a figure, calculated each year by the league through some complicated formula, using individual team and overall income from the past year, as well as projected income for the upcoming year.

If you are under the tax, you get a few million from the league. If you’re over the tax, you have to pay one dollar to the league for each dollar you are over.

Headed into the 2009-09 season, eight teams were into the tax, topped off by the New York Knicks and Dallas Mavericks who both paid about $19 million. The Cleveland Cavaliers paid $14 million, the Denver Nuggets $13 million and the rest between $3 and $8 million.

If you’re a Knicks fan, this is the part where you smash your head into the wall. Of all the teams paying the tax, only the Knicks and the Phoenix Suns didn’t make the playoffs, and the Suns were only $3 million over.

See Appendix A at the end of this article for a complete list of 2008-2009 team salaries, and the resulting record and playoff performance. It’s really quite enlightening.

The Exceptions Are the Rule

Now let’s look into some of these salary cap exceptions, most of which make a surprising amount of sense.

The rookie exception allows teams to sign first-round picks even if they are over the cap. Makes sense.

Speaking of the rookie scale in the NBA, there is a set salary number for each pick in the first round (the only ones that are guaranteed).

Blake Griffin (first round, first overall) is guaranteed $4.1 million this season, then $4.4, then $4.7, then an option in the fourth and fifth year that increases by 26.1% and 30% respectively. That ensures that rookies are handsomely paid, yet not overpaid, and they must work for that big second contract.

The last pick of the first round in this year’s draft, Christian Eyenga, is guaranteed $824,200 this year, $886,000 next season and $947,800 next year. The fourth and fifth years are optioned, but they increase by 80.5% and 50%, respectively.

All in all, a much fairer rookie wage system than the NFL, where Matthew Stafford is guaranteed more money than Phillip Rivers is with his freshly-inked deal, and Rivers has brought his team to three straight playoff appearances and an AFC Championship game. Stafford hasn’t played a down. Go figure.

Back to the exceptions, one that was much publicized in February 2008 was the Bird rights. It allows teams to re-sign their current players up to a maximum contract, and it allows them to go over the cap to do so. This could prove to be huge in the upcoming summer, as the Heat, Raptors and Cavaliers are in the best position to re-sign their stars and have the cap space to put talent around them.

Early Bird rights allow a team to re-sign a veteran for 175% of his previous season’s salary, or the NBA’s minimum salary, whichever is higher. The player in question must not have changed teams in two years, and his new deal has to be for more than two years, but not more than five.

The other salary exception of note is a trade exception. If a team trades away a player for a player who makes less salary, they are able to acquire more players to equal that salary, even if they are going over the cap.

This came into play this summer, when the Mavericks acquired Shawn Marion from Toronto, and the Magic were let in on the trade, so technically Turkoglu was a sign and trade to Toronto. The Magic received cash from the Mavericks and Toronto, as well as a trade exception for losing Turkoglu.

The trade exception also comes into play when picks are dealt, since picks don’t count as salary. They sweeten the deal for the team receiving the picks, since they get an exception which helps them fill the gap until the draft pick is made.

Other salary exceptions are for signing veterans to the minimum, as well as signing players to replace another player who in injured for the rest of the season. In the case of injury, the incoming player can be paid up to 50% of the injured player’s salary.

The Rockets applied for and were granted an injury exception for Yao Ming, due to the fact that he will likely miss the entire 2009-10 season.

With all of this NBA salary mumbo-jumbo, you might be wondering how this all affects the game on a day-to-day basis. In part two of this article, I’ll examine some teams that are famous for letting the cap dictate their personnel moves, as well as the teams that are able to ignore it completely, to varying degrees of success.

Part II is here: The NBA Salary Cap and You, Part II: The Deep, the Cheap and the Stupid

Appendix A: 2008-2009 Team Salaries, and Resulting Performance

“Throughout the centuries there were men who took first steps down new roads armed with nothing but their own vision. Their goals differed, but they all had this in common: that the step was first, the road new, the vision unborrowed, and the response they received—hatred. The great creators—the thinkers, the artists, the scientists, the inventors—stood alone against the men of their time. Every great new thought was opposed. Every great new invention was denounced. The first motor was considered foolish. The airplane was considered impossible. The power loom was considered vicious. Anesthesia was considered sinful. But the men of unborrowed vision went ahead. They fought, they suffered and they paid. But they won.”

The main character of Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead is Howard Roark, an architect who pushes the limits of his profession. He gets his start by getting kicked out of architectural school. From there he starts his own architectural firm, and even while only occasionally earning enough money to keep the lights on, he turns down clients—clients with real, life-sustaining money—who don’t share his vision.

His early buildings don’t go unnoticed; instead, they incite the fury of the architectural community. Here was someone who not only disregards the rules, but actively fights established tradition. In his own unassuming, unobstrusive way, he gives the finger to those who judge him and his work.

The 1949 movie version begins with a question that Roark answers in the affirmative: “Do you want to stand alone against the whole world?”

As if joining the conversation, in 1996 Allen Iverson entered the NBA.

He joined the league amid scouting reports that said things like “Can score on anyone at any time.” When he played, ice watered down every drink in the arena, neglected by their owners so as to not miss a single moment of AI.

He’d served hard time. He had cornrows, tattoos, a criminal record, and he embodied the hip-hop lifestyle (as far as most people knew). But what was perhaps the most shocking was the way he played the game.

Iverson’s nickname “The Answer” has never been appropriate, as it presupposes that before he joined the league there was a question—some ideological gap that needed filling. He raised his own questions, which had perhaps never been raised in the league, and in watching we all found that The Answer was in the question.

“Men have been taught that the highest virtue is not to achieve, but to give. Yet one cannot give that which has not been created. Creation comes before distribution—or there will be nothing to distribute. The need of the creator comes before the need of any possible beneficiary. Yet we are taught to admire the second-hander who dispenses gifts he has not produced above the man who made the gifts possible. We praise an act of charity. We shrug at an act of achievement.”

It’s not to say that shooting is of a higher virtue than passing, or that a 2 guard is on a higher plane than a point.

Iverson is one of only a handful of players that are positionless; we assign them positions because that’s what we do in basketball, but in these case they don’t proscribe their style of play and only poorly describe it. We call LeBron James a small forward because he’s 6’8″ though he’s got the girth to play the 4, shoots like a 2 and passes like a point. We likewise have assigned Iverson the designation of a shooting guard—primarily because he’s short and because every square peg must fit in one of these five round holes.

Iverson isn’t a shooting guard, though. He’s a creator.

John Stockton is widely recognized as one of the finest point guards to ever play the position known for setting up others. In his 1998 season with the Finals-bound Jazz he averaged 8.5 assists per game, having perfected the pick and roll with Karl Malone. Contrast that with Iverson, perhaps the most “selfish” player to ever play the game, and his 2004-05 scoring title campaign. He averaged 30.7 points per game, and still averaged a personal high water mark 7.9 assists—only a half assist off the great Stockton.

Magic Johnson was the best point guard of all time because he was also an all-time great creator. He averaged 11 assists a game throughout his career, but also almost 20 points (Stockton: 13).

At his peak, Iverson produced creative performances that ranks with those of Michael Jordan and even Oscar Robertson, the godfather of all creators.

“In all proper relationships there is no sacrifice of anyone to anyone. An architect needs clients, but he does not subordinate his work to their wishes. They need him, but they do not order a house just to give him a commission. Men exchange their work by free, mutual consent to mutual advantage when their personal interests agree and they both desire the exchange. If they do not desire it, they are not forced to deal with each other. They seek further. This is the only possible form of relationship between equals. Anything else is a relation of slave to master, or victim to executioner.”

AI said in 2007 how long he wanted to play in the NBA: “Until I can’t be Allen Iverson on the court, until I can’t dominate. When you look at the scouting report and my name is not the first name, you have to stop; then it’s time to go. I don’t want to be an old guy sitting on the bench for a championship team. I’m not coming off nobody’s bench.”

He made his bed, and now popular media refuses to let him lie in it. He stands alone against the whole world in his insistence to only play for a team as a starter, when to do anything else would be to go back on his word. In a world and a time where celebrity is allowed to lie, steal, and manipulate the public, Iverson is taking flak for doing what he’s publicly planned to do for years.

Allen Iverson can not, and should not, come off the bench.

Iverson knows, as well, what most of us are loathe to acknowledge—that the game of an off-the-bench Iverson isn’t the same as that of the starter Iverson, just in a smaller quantity. Off the bench, he’s a washed-up under-sized shooting guard. As a starter he’s still old and short, but he is true to himself. And to his game.

Eventually Howard Roark dynamites a series of buildings that would be some of his finest work, after they aren’t built to his exacting specifications.

“I recognize no obligations toward men except one: to respect their freedom and to take no part in a slave society. To my country, I wish to give the ten years which I will spend in jail if my country exists no longer. I will spend them in memory and in gratitude for what my country has been. It will be my act of loyalty, my refusal to live or work in what has taken its place.” [speech by Howard Roark, from Ayn Rand's The Fountainhead]

There’s still time for a team to sign Iverson. Maybe the Memphis Grizzlies, maybe the Miami Heat, maybe the New York Knicks, maybe the Charlotte Bobcats, maybe Olympiakos. But he owes it to himself, and to us as fans, to do it as a starter.

As someone who’s won an MVP, been in the NBA Finals, and won four scoring titles, perhaps his biggest accomplishment will be to stick by his principles and walk away from the game while he is still Allen Iverson.

By bringing in Shaquille O’Neal and Anthony Parker—both of whom might be starters—the Cavs have shown that they won’t be satisfied with anything less than championship.

After Cleveland’s NBA Finals appearance in 2007, they brought in Delonte West and Ben Wallace before the February trade deadline to help LeBron James bring home a ring. When that didn’t happen, they traded that summer for Mo Williams as a point guard upgrade.

But just how much of an upgrade are O’Neal and Parker over Zydrunas Ilgauskas and Delonte West (assuming Parker gets the call to start over West)?

We won’t know for sure until we see which team is lifting the Larry O’Brien trophy in 2010. But Spider Graphs can give us an idea statistically of what we can expect from this new lineup.

If you’re new to Spider Graphs, they’re a new way to reflect a player or team’s statistics in a visual way that gives you an overall impression of their style. Read the quick Spider Graph explanation here before you go any further to get a handle on how they work.

And just as another refresher, the top half of the graph represents offense, the bottom is defense; the top right is perimeter players, and the bottom left is big men.

First up is Parker vs. West. These graphs use 2008 regular season numbers, per-48-minutes instead of per-game to remove any discrepancies in playing time:

We started with this graph because it’s easily the least dramatic Spider Graph you’ll ever see.

West has a slight edge in quickness, which is reflected on the steals axis. His better FG% could be tied to quickness as well, as West can finish at the basket better than the aging Parker.

Parker has the edge in rebounding, which for a 2 guard is all about court smarts. Statistically, that’s all he’s got on West.

Parker fills a larger role for the Cavaliers, though, which isn’t measured in numbers.

He’s known for his on-ball defense, and that combined with his long arms gives the Cavs a shut-down defender that can handle an opposing team’s star. Taking on that role relieves LeBron James of that duty, taking some pressure off the King and allowing him to focus on what he does best.

So who gets the starting role? It doesn’t matter in the end, as the point of signing Parker was not to replace West.

It was to have two Wests.

Whether West or Parker is on the floor at tip-off, the acquisition allows the Cavaliers to have a talented shooting guard—a first-stringer on most teams—come in with the second unit. And since Delonte West can slide over to the point as well, the Cavaliers’ depth problems in the backfield may be over.

Now the bigger (get it?) comparison, Shaq vs. Ilguaskas:

Hello, upgrade.

One thing Spider Graphs do well is show when a player outdoes another player in every (or almost every) statistical category—the dominating player’s graph completely encompasses the other’s.

This is one of those cases.

Shaq isn’t the league-dominating center that he once was, but if his production is anything like last year’s he’ll be a welcome addition to the Cavaliers’ lineup.

Shaq has more scoring potential than Ilgauskas, for sure, but the biggest difference is found in their FG%—which is also terribly deceiving.

Though Ilgauskas’ listed FG% is lower than O’Neal’s, it’s actually because he’s a better shooter. He can, and does, shoot from anywhere on the floor, whereas Shaq plays all his offense within dunking range of the basket.

That’s the liability with O’Neal, as well. Since Ilgauskas can shoot from anywhere, he spreads the floor and opens up the driving lane for LeBron. If Shaq clogs up the lane with his 300-pound frame, the James’s impact is marginalized and the offense will suffer.

The Cavs’ center situation, however, is just like their 2 guard situation—they’ve brought in a capable player while still retaining the incumbent.

While Ilgauskas is slowing down as well, he’s still a serviceable center and provides a high-level backup to O’Neal. He’s also a fan-favorite, and held many of the Cavaliers’ records that LeBron has since broken.

And finally, we compare last season’s starting five (Williams, West, James, Varejao, and Ilgauskas) to next season’s potential starters (Williams, Parker, James, Varejao, O’Neal):

The difference is anything but dramatic. Team FG% goes up slightly because of Shaq, and Shaq’s scoring boost is mostly offset by starting Parker in place of West.

In short, while Cleveland’s biggest coup this offseason may have been snagging an aging, has-been center, they’ve still come out as a much better team because of their much improved depth.

For the third year in a row, it brings them one step closer to their ultimate goal.

A ring for the King.

This is the fourth in a series of articles analyzing the offseason moves of the league’s elite teams, each using Spider Graphs. Check out also the analysis of the Orlando Magic, Los Angeles Lakers, and Boston Celtics.

Just who’s going to start, anyway?

The Celtics signed Rasheed Wallace out of free agency, adding the 6’11″ Sheed to a frontcourt that already boasts Kevin Garnett and Kendrick Perkins. KG has the power forward starting spot locked down, clearly, but is Perkins’ spot as the starting center in danger?

It is, of course, impossible to predict team chemistry and how a single player will the performance of a team overall, but statistics let us make some rough estimates.

And for this, we turn to Spider Graphs.

If you haven’t seen Spider Graphs before, they’re a new way to reflect a player or team’s statistics in a visual way that gives you an overall impression of their style. If you’re unfamiliar with how to read them and how they’re created, read the quick Spider Graph explanation here before you go any further (really, you’ll regret it if you don’t).

And just as another refresher, the top half of the graph is offense, the bottom is defense; the top right is perimeter players, and the bottom left is big men.

Perkins has been a solid presence in the middle for Boston, including in their championship run two years ago. Wallace has a ring of his own, and has the ability to spread the floor a bit with his shooting.

Without further ado, here’s how they stack up using 2008 statistics. These graphs use per-48-minutes instead of per-game statistics, to remove any discrepancies in playing time:

It’s obvious right off the bat that we’re dealing with two very different players here.

Kendrick Perkins fits the traditional big man mold. The lower left section of his graph dominates, indicating that he does the things expected of a strong interior presence: block shots, grab rebounds, and take high percentage shots.

He scored a career-high 13.8 points per 48 minutes (8.5 per game) last year, but in the Celtics’ system his defensive abilities are paramount.

Rasheed Wallace’s, on the other hand, points to a completely different style of play.

The lower shooting percentage is indicative of his tendency to play away from the basket. The stronger steals axis suggests that he’s much quicker than Perkins, and while he’s one or two rebounds shy of Perkins he makes up for it with a few extra points per game.

Wallace’s graph is actually more similar to those of Ron Artest and Hedo Turkoglu, both small forwards, than traditional power forwards—let alone centers.

With these differences in mind, let’s see how it affects the starting five overall:

This graph adds Wallace and Perkins’ statistics in with the other starters: Rajon Rondo, Ray Allen, Paul Pierce, and Kevin Garnett.

Not a lot is different, clearly, once everyone is accounted for. In most cases, swapping out one player will only make incremental difference to a lineup, and this is one of those cases.

But there are differences. The most evident change is the presence of a strong pivot with Perkins in the middle—the rebounds and FG% are up. Wallace, instead, makes them a more versatile team.

And for Boston, Perkins may actually be a better fit. The aging Celtics, minus Rondo, aren’t known for their quick first step driving into the paint—which Wallace opens up by spreading the floor.

Instead, the Irish have enough shooters on the perimeter that Perkins pounding the middle can be exactly what they need to keep opposing defenses honest.

In the end, if the Rasheed Wallace experiment works, his career could be reinvigorated as he jells with the team’s other stars; with his abilities on both ends of the floor, this Celtics starting five could be dangerous top-to-bottom.

If it fails, the Celts may have just added a sputtering, fizzling 34-year-old forward/center who wanders out of the post and led the league in technical fouls last year.

The great news for Doc Rivers and Boston fans is that they don’t have to choose one or the other. Perkins and Wallace are both on the roster, and will split minutes to keep opponents guessing.

That kind of depth can really make a difference for a team that already has a strong starting lineup.

Perhaps enough to get them back into an NBA Finals.

This is the third in a series of articles analyzing the offseason moves of the league’s elite teams, each using Spider Graphs. Check out the analysis of the Orlando Magic and the Los Angeles Lakers.

Some laud the signing, pointing to Artest’s dedication to contributing on both ends of the floor. Other criticize his age and decision-making, and bemoan the loss of Trevor Ariza’s explosive athleticism and untapped potential.

The real result will come this season on the floor of Staples Center. But in the meantime, here at How To Watch Sports we solve things the statistical way, and Spider Graphs can give us some idea how much impact the Artest-Ariza swap might have.

If you haven’t seen Spider Graphs before, they’re a new way to reflect a player or team’s statistics in a visual way that gives you an overall impression of their style. If you’re unfamiliar with how to read them and how they’re created, read the quick Spider Graph explanation here before you go any further.

And just as a refresher, the top half of the graph is offense, the bottom is defense; the top right is perimeter players, and the bottom left is big men.

The Lakers are unique among the league’s elite teams in that their offseason moves were minimal. While the Magic, Cavaliers, and Celtics all made roster-shattering moves, the Lakers simply exchangeed talented small forwards straight across (via free agency) with the Houston Rockets.

To give us an idea how much each team gained and lost in the move, here is the comparison of Artest and Ariza’s 2008 statistics. These graphs use per-48-minutes instead of per-game statistics, to remove any discrepancies in playing time:

Really, we end up without too many surprises.

First of all, it’s no surprise that Artest has higher scoring numbers. It’s unlikely that he’ll have the same responsibilities in Los Angeles as he did in Houston, however, where he picked up scoring slack for the injured Tracy McGrady. He’ll be at best the Lakers’ third scoring option behind Kobe Bryant and Pau Gasol, and perhaps the fourth or fifth behind Lamar Odom and even Andrew Bynum.

But we know Artest isn’t afraid of putting up shots, and he brings to the Lakers another offensive threat that can punish defenses if they play off him to double Kobe.

That said, It’s still likely that Artest and Ariza’s raw scoring numbers will be reversed next season as they fill each others roles on their new teams.

The biggest surprise of the graph is that Ariza’s defensive numbers outdo Artest’s. While Artest is a physical defender, Ariza is younger and quicker—and we see his ability to jump passing lanes reflected in his strong steals axis.

Does that mean Ariza is a better defender than Artest? Not necessarily—steals and blocks often come when acting as a help defender instead of an on-ball defender (where Artest shines). But it does mean that they’re at least in the same category.

So, both players have their strengths. But is it enough to dramatically shift the team one direction or the other?

Short answer: Not really.

This graph adds together the Lakers starting five, with Ariza in place for last year and Artest for this year. The other starting four are Derek Fisher, Bryant, Gasol, and Bynum.

What we can see here is a loaded Laker team that has swapped out one talented small forward for another. Any difference that Artest makes over Ariza statistically is incremental, and thus the 2008-09 and 2009-10 graphs are almost identical.

The biggest differences, then, will be the intangibles that Artest can bring. He’s a strong leader, and may fit quite well in to Phil Jackson’s ‘system.

Adding Artest certainly can’t make the Lakers worse. And even if the team doesn’t get much better, that’s probably still okay.

They did win the championship, after all.

This is the second in a series of articles analyzing the offseason moves of the league’s elite teams, each using Spider Graphs. Check out the Orlando Magic analysis here.

They replaced two of their starters, bringing in Vince Carter and Brandon Bass to start in place of the departed Courtney Lee and Hedo Turkoglu. But does it make them a better team?

Spider Graphs can give us an idea.

If you haven’t seen Spider Graphs before, they’re a new way to reflect a player or team’s statistics in a visual way that gives you an overall impression of their style. They were created and first used by the author in evaluating the 2009 NBA Finals, and their origin (and a explanation of Spider Graph methodology) is here.

Here’s a quick summary. The top half of the graph represents offensive statistics (FG%, points, and assists), and the bottom half represents defense (steals, blocks, and rebounds—which I strongly feel are a defensive statistic). A player whose graph has more area up top should be considered a bigger contributor on offense, and a larger bottom half suggests a defensive focus.

To add another layer, the three upper-right statistics (points, assists, and steals) tend to be associated with perimeter players, whereas the bottom-left three (blocks, rebounds, and high FG%) tend to be the jurisdiction of big men.

These graphs use maximum values of 40 points, 20 rebounds, 20 assists, 5 blocks, 5 steals, and 75% shooting, normalized so that they’re all on a scale from 0-100. A zero score represents zero in every case except FG%, where zero on the graph represents 25% shooting (to amplify differences between players).

All statistics are per 48 minutes instead of per game, to account for differences in playing time for players coming from other teams. They use 2008 regular season numbers, and are only meant to reflect past statistical performance, leaving out intangibles and change to a player’s game over time.

Without further ado, here we go!

First let’s examine swapping Hedo Turkoglu out of the lineup for Brandon Bass. It’s an interesting comparison because Turkoglu played small forward for the Magic and Bass is a power forward, but ESPN reports that Orlando will be sliding Rashard Lewis into the 3 spot and starting Bass at the 4.

Even at a quick glance we can see that Turkoglu, despite being 6’10″, plays more like a wing than a big man—his statistics exceed Bass’s in all three of the upper-right categories.

Bass on the other hand plays much more like a traditional big, and his graph shows it, with heavy emphasis in the lower left.

What the graph doesn’t show here, however, is that Bass hasn’t held a starting role in the NBA before now. The graph shows that his per-minute statistics are good, and the Magic will benefit from his interior presence if he can play a whole game at that level. Last year he averaged just over 19 minutes per contest.

Based on the area of Bass’s graph being larger than Turkoglu’s, we could see Bass become more of a statistical producer this year than the Turk was last year—and as a young player (this will be his fifth season) he may continue to improve year after year.

The Magic depended on Turkoglu to come through big in the fourth quarter, which he did regularly. While it’s hard to see Bass measuring up as well in clutch situations, he may very well be a 40-minute guy that consistently takes care of business.

Next up: Vince Carter replacing Courtney Lee.

Lee’s graph is the archetype of the athletic two guard. The spike toward steals reflects his quickness, and the indentation on the assist axis reveals that he is, in fact, a shooting guard and not a point.

In analyzing last year’s Finals, we found that Lee and Trevor Ariza play similar games, as reflected by their Spider Graphs. Check it out here.

Lee gets shown up by Vinsanity, however, in almost every category. Everyone knows Vince Carter is an offensive powerhouse, but the graph adds context by showing exactly how much the Magic have upgraded offensively at the 2 by bringing in Carter—assuming his efficiency is similar to last year’s.

Vince adds versatility, as well—his assist and rebound numbers outdo those of Lee, who was a rookie last year.

Where the Magic lose in the Vince trade is on defense, which doesn’t get accurately depicted in the graph. That’s one area where Lee has shined, especially during Orlando’s 2009 playoff run where he was called upon to defend Kobe Bryant.

So, with those two moves made, where do the Magic stand?

Verdict: Better statistically than last year, across the five starters (depth is a different discussion).

Because of the NBA’s salary cap and trade restrictions, it’s difficult for a team to improve more than incrementally any given year. But to take a team that went to the Finals last year and improve—even that small increment—can be a very big deal.

It’s difficult to see in the graph, and of course it’s difficult for individual players to make a huge impact on an overall team’s statistics, but the graph for this year’s Magic squad wins in almost every category.

Since the points average is higher but the assists have remained constant, we can assume that they’ve added someone who can create their own shot (Vince). They’ve added some paint presence as well, highlighted by the heightened rebound and block statistics (and brought by Bass).

And most importantly, they did it without giving up too much in other categories. The only area where they are noticeably hurting is steals, which they enjoyed from Courtney Lee’s quickness and tenacity on defense.

Overall, it appears that the Orlando Magic have done well for themselves this offseason. If Carter can fit into the team’s chemistry and defensive scheme, and if Bass can put up numbers for big minutes, the Magic could be back in the Finals next year.

Unless everybody else got even better.

This article is the first in a series applying Spider Graphs to 2009 NBA Offseason moves. Stay tuned for analyses of Cleveland, Boston, the Lakers, and others. See other Spider Graph articles here.

If you’re stuck in 2001, that is.

The names of Shaquille O’Neal, Vince Carter, and Rasheed Wallace don’t strike fear into teams’ hearts like they used to, yet they’ve each convinced a front office that they’re the missing piece of a championship run.

Even Ron Artest and Lamar Odom—involved in some of the league’s other biggest transactions—could be seen as in the twilights of their respective careers.

Let’s break down some off these offseason also-rans.

Shaquille O’Neal
Age: 37
Years in the League: 17
Statistical Peak: 1999-2000 season

First, the Cleveland Cavaliers picked up Shaquille O’Neal via trade. While he had a renaissance of sorts in Phoenix last season, it’s clear that his best days are behind him. His 1999-2000 stat line of 29.7 points, 13.7 rebounds and 3 blocks per game has since sloped gradually downward to 17.7 points, 8.4 rebounds, and 1.4 blocks.

An aging Shaq is still an upgrade over an aging Zydrunas Ilgauskas, but the Big Shacquisition may not the blockbuster move that brings the Larry O’Brien Trophy to Cleveland.

From Cleveland’s perspective, he’s still a physical center who can rumble against Dwight Howard down low, should the Cavs meet the Orlando Magic again in the playoffs. But that’s ignoring the fact that Orlando’s pick-and-roll was perhaps even deadlier than Howard alone, and O’Neal has gotten his feet in molasses to the point that he won’t be any help defending the pick-and-roll.

And speaking of Orlando…

Vince Carter
Age: 32
Years in the League: 11
Statistical Peak: 2000-2001 season

Upon entering the league, Vinsanity made his living above the rim. At the age of 32 he’s still a contributor, but anyone expecting the old Vince to show up to the Amway Arena is going to be disappointed.

It’s been nine years since Vince jumped completely over 7’2″ French center Frédéric Weis for a dunk in the Olympics. It was a fine moment to be an American, for sure, but it’s ancient history now.

While Vince is a bigger, flashier name than Hedo Turkoglu (who the team gave up to get him), it’s questionable how much he can improve the team.

Turkoglu was a 6’10″ walking mismatch who could shoot the three all day long, and carved out a niche of being a clutch late-game shooter. It was the combination of him and Rashard Lewis, who possesses similar perimeter skills, that gave the team a unique offensive structure and allowed their Cavalier-killing pick-and-roll.

The aging Carter, however, looks more and more every year like a traditional 2-guard who just needs the ball. Look at the number of free throws he’s taken per game in the past few years and it becomes clear that he’s settling for jump shots instead of attacking the rim. The Magic’s lineup of mismatches just got a lot more matchable.

And another superstar who needs the ball in his hands, no matter how big a name, might not be the right ingredient if Dwight Howard is already griping about not having enough touches.

Rasheed Wallace
Age: 34
Years in the League: 14
Statistical Peak: 2001-2002 season

The Celtics picked up ‘Sheed for the mid-level exception, which makes them look a lot smarter than Orlando (who gave up both Courtney Lee and Rafer Alston for Carter), though out of the three Cleveland probably got an even better deal (giving up only Sasha Pavlovic and a retiring-anyway Ben Wallace for the Diesel).

Wallace does fill a weak roster spot for the Leprechauns, but may be flying on his reputation more than his recent performance. His scoring and field goal percentage are at career lows (okay, he scored fewer points as a rookie, but we’ll let that slide), and he’s not getting fouled at the same rate.

His embarrassing 6.5 points per game in the playoffs, while his Detroit Pistons were getting defiled by the Cavaliers, should tell the whole story.

For Boston’s sake, hopefully the Stephon Marbury experiment wasn’t a fluke and they really do have the chemistry to handle poor locker room guys. Because if Rasheed doesn’t produce in the middle, he’s just a handful of technical fouls and some pre-game trash talk.

The Rest

There are plenty of big-name players—Artest, Odom, Antonio McDyess, Steve Nash, Jason Kidd, Shawn Marion, Grant Hill—who have found themselves to be hot commodities this NBA offseason even in their advancing years.

It’s as though GMs have forgotten what year it is.

Most of these players will still have something left in the tank, it’s likely, but when superstars age they can become surprisingly mediocre. Some, like Jason Kidd, adapt to their age and find a new calling in a modified role.

Others, like Allen Iverson—perhaps the only free agent that nobody wants—do not age gracefully and simply become a shell of their former selves.

For us, we’ll just have to wait and see which transactions work and which ones fail.

Or close our eyes and pretend it’s still 2001.

It’s not an absolute, of course, as coaches and managers play a significant role in both sports. But the coach gets the credit for winning in basketball, whereas in baseball the manager may be more deserving.

On a much greater level than in the NBA, baseball teams function as a pure collection of talent. A general manager can plug different players into the lineup at will (and often does) with the expectation that the team will run similarly despite the change.

It helps that both offense and defense in baseball are much more individual endeavors than they are in other sports. The maximum number of players that can be involved in offense is four (one batter, three base runners), and the number of plays that are typically called in such a situation are very few.

Baseball defense works the same way. The onus is on the pitcher, of course, but when the ball makes it into the field it typically involves only up to three more people—and that’s on a double play. A groundout to first involves two defensive players, running the same play they always run.

Because of this structure behind the game of baseball, the job of the GM becomes wildly more important. So much depends on the talent of the individual players over fancy play-calling that assembling the correct roster (recognizing, of course, that a player’s clubhouse style is also important) is perhaps the biggest key to winning.

It hearkens to the managerial role in video games. If you can pick up a slightly faster receiver or a slightly more accurate quarterback in Madden, you do it without worrying how the new player will fit into the system—while real-life football transactions work very, very differently.

Baseball’s “hot stove” offseason is thus typically one of the best in sports. Lots of players move as GMs look to improve where they can. Plenty of trades are made during the regular season before the deadline, as well, as top teams try to load up with ringers on their way to the playoffs.

The NBA, however, is quite different.

Roster talent is important, but it’s much more on par significance-wise with coaching. We saw that very clearly in the NBA Eastern Conference Finals this year, as Stan Van Gundy outclassed Mike Brown in leading his Orlando Magic over the Cleveland Cavaliers.

While LeBron turned out an impressive individual performance, it was the Magic’s consistent pick-and-roll execution that won the series—the Cavaliers were simply unable to adapt strategically to Orlando’s offensive sets.

Thus the NBA offseason tends to be a little less interesting. The big free agent moves last year were Elton Brand and Baron Davis, and both of them involved the Clippers.

Teams tend to avoid big moves to keep their core intact, assuming that any lack of success was due to unpolished execution of the coach’s system that can be solved with continuity. A team’s GM might move a draft pick or two to shore up specific positions on the bench, but compared to MLB’s offseason the basketball summer tends to be fairly dry.

Part of this can be due to the NBA’s salary-matching rule for trades. While in baseball it’s fairly common to trade a star for a couple of prospects (think of the trade that sent C.C. Sabathia to the Brewers, or the one that send Mark Teixiera to the Angels), it just doesn’t happen in the NBA.

Combine that with the fact that NBA teams just have fewer players than MLB teams, and you get a lot less offseason movement.

This NBA offseason, however, we’ve seen a mad rush for talent. Some teams have worked hard to fill the needs in their rosters, but some of the league’s upper-echelon teams have found themselves in an arms race for sheer, unadulterated skills.

The Cleveland Cavaliers, for one, jumped on the opportunity to bring in Shaquille O’Neal. It wasn’t the worst personnel move ever made—he’s a clear upgrade at center, will take some defensive pressure off LeBron, and has shown he still has gas in the tank—but center wasn’t the team’s biggest need.

The playoffs exposed the Cavs’ need for good defensive wing players and some depth in the backcourt, but the prospect of adding Shaq was too much to pass up. And while they did fill a couple holes with Anthony Parker and (presumably) Jamario Moon, they put their big money where they already had serviceable center Zydrunas Ilgauskas.

The Los Angeles Lakers, in an awkward move, signed Ron Artest to play the position that Trevor Ariza had blossomed into. They’ve lost Ariza and may now lose Lamar Odom as well from their championship squad. Artest was too much to pass up.

The Magic picked up Vince Carter in a trade, signalling that they were done with small forward Hedo Turkoglu. It seems like a good move, except that Turkoglu was an integral part of the team’s advance to the NBA Finals—the pick-and-roll run with Turkoglu and Rashard Lewis on the perimeter was what created the mismatches that beat the Cavaliers. Vince was just too compelling.

And all of this is event without mentioning how the Minnesota Timberwolves drafted two consecutive point guards, because they were the two most talented players on the board. Nor does it venture into the dark, twisted world of the Miami Heat who just signed a fourth center to their roster.

The result (so far) of this offseason’s talent gluttony is an apparent widening of the division between the haves and have-nots—much like exists in baseball. Big names like Shaq, Artest, Vinsanity, and Rasheed Wallace have been snapped up by the league’s top four teams, akin to the Yankees and the Red Sox treating lesser teams like farm clubs and absorbing their top talents.

Time, of course, is what will indicate whether these roster moves were improvements and whether the new additions fit into the coaches’ respective systems.

But, if nothing else, this NBA offseason has given basketball fans a “hot stove” season like baseball fans enjoy. Even with an ailing economy, the prospect of hoarding talent became too much to pass up.

And the NBA’s summer got a little more interesting.